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Abstract Decisions about how to share resources with others often need to be taken
under uncertainty regarding its allocational consequences. Although risk preferences
are likely important, existing research is silent about how social and risk preferences
interact in such situations. In this paper we provide experimental evidence on this
question. In a first experiment givers are not exposed to risk while beneficiaries’ final
earnings may be larger or smaller than the allocation itself, depending on the realized
state of the world. In a second experiment, risk affects the earnings of givers but not
of beneficiaries. We find that individuals’ risk preferences are predictive for giving in
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both experiments. Increased risk exposure of beneficiaries tends to decrease giving
whereas increased risk exposure of givers has no effect. We propose a simple non-
linear generalization of a model allowing for other-regarding preferences, ex-post and
ex-ante fairness, and risk aversion. We find some support for it in our data when risk
is on the beneficiaries’ side but less so when risk is on the givers’ side. Our results
point to the importance of the further development of models of social preferences
that also incorporate risk preferences.
Keywords Fairness · Uncertainty · Risk · Other-regarding preferences · Social
preferences · Risk preferences · Experiment
JEL Classification C91 · D03 · D64 · D81
1 Introduction
A large empirical literature shows that individuals are willing to sacrifice some of
their own material interests to the advantage of others, even if those people are anony-
mous. Interestingly, this evidence has almost exclusively been gathered for situations
where the decision to give is made under full information about its distributional
consequences.1 Arguably, this information condition is not often met in reality. For
example, when donating money to charities there is usually no guarantee about how
exactly beneficiaries will benefit (e.g., due to environmental and organizational risks
or due to uncertainty about the marginal utility to the beneficiary of an extra dollar
of donation). Not only potential beneficiaries, but also givers themselves are often
exposed to uncertainty regarding the exact consequences of resources kept. Unless
these resources are immediately consumed, welfare effects can substantially vary
depending on the giver’s exposure to health, safety, or financial risks.
The question is whether such irresolvable uncertainty influences giving behavior,
and if so how and through which channels? Are people more or less generous when
the beneficiaries’ or their own personal situation is uncertain? What are the determin-
ing factors of giving when final outcomes are risky? Intuitively, social preferences as
well as individual risk preferences will affect giving in the face of risk. While there
is an extensive literature on the role of social preferences under certainty (Camerer
2003; Engel 2011) and a smaller, growing, literature on ex-post and ex-ante perspec-
tives on fairness under risk (e.g., Brock et al. 2013; Cappelen et al. 2013), to date
the role of risk preferences remains unstudied. In this paper we present, to the best
of our knowledge, first evidence on how own risk preferences and perceived risk
preferences of others affect generosity in situations where risk cannot be resolved.
We present the results of two stylized experiments designed to investigate how
exogenous outcome uncertainty on respectively the givers’ and beneficiaries’ side
affects giving behavior. The experiments are based on the standard dictator game
1See Engel (2011) for a meta study on dictator games under certainty. The few recent exceptions taking
uncertainty into account will be discussed below.
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(Forsythe et al. 1994) and vary riskiness in a controlled way. In the first experiment,
givers can make a transfer to beneficiaries who are exposed to various forms of risk
(we will refer to this experiment as RISK-B). Importantly, the size of the transfer
has to be decided before risk is resolved, and the beneficiaries’ final earnings can be
smaller or larger than the transfer itself, depending on the realized state of the world.
In a second experiment we study giving behavior in mirror-image situations when
givers’ final outcomes are risky and known only after the allocation decision, while
beneficiaries’ outcomes are certain (we refer to this experiment as RISK-G).
In both experiments participants are matched in pairs and randomly assigned the
role of either giver (G) or beneficiary (B).2 To increase salience, both G and B indi-
vidually work on a real effort task by which they earn money that is deposited in
a joint account of the pair. After the task is completed, G is asked to divide the
deposited money between himself and B, in several allocation problems character-
ized by different degrees of risk. In experiment RISK-B, G always earns exactly what
he keeps while the final earnings of B are risky. Specifically, in each allocation prob-
lem B’s final earnings are either larger or smaller than the allocation itself, but are in
expected value equal to it. Conversely, in experiment RISK-G, G’s final earnings are
risky and in expectation equal to the share he keeps for himself, while B earns exactly
what is allocated to her. In order to examine how risk preferences affect givers’ allo-
cation decisions, we elicit participants’ own attitude to risk as well as their beliefs
about the risk attitude of others, in an incentive compatible way in both experiments.
Our results show that in both experiments the risk preferences of givers are pre-
dictive for their allocation choices. In RISK-B, givers’ risk aversion is positively
correlated with the shares allocated to beneficiaries, indicating that givers, on aver-
age, compensate beneficiaries’ exposure to risk by taking into account their own
attitudes toward risk. In RISK-G, givers’ risk aversion is negatively correlated with
their giving behavior, suggesting that the more risk averse they are, the more they
compensate themselves for their exposure to risk. In both experiments givers’ own
risk attitudes are positively correlated with their beliefs about beneficiaries’ risk
attitudes, but the latter have basically no predictive power. Thus, givers’ own risk
preferences appear to be important determinants of their generosity under risk.
These effects of individual risk preferences on generosity are robust to control-
ling for the riskiness of the allocation problem. Riskiness has an independent effect
on giving behavior, which differs between experiments. In RISK-B allocations to the
beneficiary are significantly negatively correlated with the riskiness of the benefi-
ciary’s earnings, especially when risk is large. In contrast, in RISK-G, no correlation
between giving and the riskiness of the giver’s earnings is found.
To date there is no model available that incorporates both social preferences and
risk preferences in a canonical way. We therefore did not have any clearly formu-
lated hypotheses prior to the study. However, after having presented the results, we
discuss a simple non-linear generalization of a model allowing for other-regarding
2Throughout the paper we refer to beneficiaries as female and givers as male. In the experiment genders
were mixed over roles.
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preferences, ex-ante and ex-post fairness concerns, and risk aversion and link it to
observed behavior.
Saito (2013) extended the popular other-regarding preferences model of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) to analyze ex-ante and ex-post motives of fairness when outcomes
are risky.3 His model retains (piece-wise) linearity in own and others’ earnings and
is therefore silent about the potential effect of risk aversion on allocation decisions.
We propose a combination of Neilson’s (2006) non-linear generalization of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) with Saito’s (2013) approach to allow for other-regarding preferences
and risk aversion. Using this simple extension we find that behavior in RISK-B is
surprisingly consistent with the model’s predictions. This is however much less the
case for behavior in RISK-G, indicating the importance of the further development
of models of other-regarding preferences that also incorporate risk preferences.
Our paper contributes to the small but growing experimental literature that inves-
tigates decision situations under risk where social preferences may matter. A few
papers explored whether people care about ex-ante (procedural) or ex-post (outcome)
fairness or both. Bolton et al. (2005) have been the first to experimentally test pro-
cedural fairness and find that people do care for fair procedures. Brock et al. (2013)
conduct dictator game experiments with risky outcomes to explore whether ex-post
or ex-ante fairness considerations are more important. Their results suggest that both
motives contribute to explain dictators’ allocation behavior, and that behavior in a
standard (risk free) dictator game correlates with giving in risky situations.
In Krawczyk and Lec (2010) subjects can share chances to win a prize with an
anonymous other in lotteries that are either correlated or independent. They find that
dictators give away more chances in the latter case and that motives other than sim-
ple inequity aversion are at play when individuals share chances. Cappelen et al.
(2013) analyze the allocations of both non-involved subjects and dictators in situ-
ations where inequalities in output are the result of antecedent choices under risk.
They observe that, although many participants favor some redistribution ex-post,
the allocation decisions of most dictators and non-involved subjects are exclusively
motivated by the consideration of ex-ante opportunities.4
Our study differs in several aspects from those discussed above. Most importantly,
to our knowledge, none has directly addressed the role of individual risk preferences
on giving behavior when risk cannot be resolved. We elicit participants’ risk prefer-
ences and beliefs about the preferences of others in a task free from social aspects.
3For another popular outcome based model of other-regarding preferences, see Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), and for extensions of such models incorporating risk prior to Saito (2013), see Trautmann (2009)
and Krawczyk (2011). All these models (implicitly) assume risk-neutrality.
4More remotely our paper is also related to studies that investigate how non-involved individuals (spec-
tators) allocate money or chances to individuals in need (Rohde and Rohde 2015; Andreoni et al. 2016;
Cettolin and Riedl 2017). Rohde and Rohde (2015) find that spectators are averse to ex-ante inequality
and individual risk, while they seek ex-post inequality and collective risk. Andreoni et al. (2016) find that
uninvolved individuals exhibit time-inconsistency in their social preferences, in the sense that they can
hold incompatible ex-ante and ex-post views of fairness. Cettolin and Riedl (2017) find that spectators are
highly heterogeneous in what they consider to be a just allocation under risk, but that on average they tend
to allocate less to individuals who are more exposed to risk.
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In addition, we systematically vary the potential dispersion of both the beneficiary’s
and the giver’s final outcomes in a way that allows us to investigate (i) how giving
responds to the riskiness of the situation and (ii) how identical risk on the bene-
ficiary’s and the giver’s side, respectively, affects giving behavior. Together, these
design elements allow us to relate giving behavior to an individual’s own and believed
risk preferences as well as to the riskiness of own and others’ earnings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the experimen-
tal design is described in detail. Results are presented in Section 3 and in Section 4
we relate them to theoretical predictions of our proposed model and also report some
additional results for allocation problems under ambiguity. In Section 5 conclud-
ing remarks are drawn. The experiment instructions are provided in the Electronic
Supplementary Material (ESM).
2 Experiment design
Both experiments, RISK-B and RISK-G, are computerized and consist of three parts.
In what follows the different parts are described in detail. We start with Part 1, which
can be divided into two sub-parts.
Part 1.a: Real effort task After all participants have taken a seat in their designated
computer station, they are informed that the experiment consists of three parts. The
instructions for the first part are then distributed and read out aloud by the exper-
imenter. At the beginning of the first part participants are randomly paired. One
participant is assigned the role of giver (G) and the other the role of Beneficiary (B).5
Roles are fixed throughout the experiment and subjects are informed about this.
Thereafter all participants work on a real effort task, the so-called slider task (Gill
and Prowse 2012). On the computer screen 32 sliders on horizontal bars are dis-
played. Each slider can be moved with the mouse for an unlimited number of times
and the position of a slider is displayed to the right of the bar with a number between
0 and 100. A slider is correctly positioned when the number 50 appears, that is when
the slider is positioned exactly in the middle of the bar. Productivity is measured by
the number of sliders positioned at 50 in 6 minutes’ time. During the task subjects
view their own actual productivity and the amount of time remaining.
The slider task is easy to explain and to understand, is identical across repetitions
and has no scope for guessing. The task is incentivized by awarding AC0.25 for each
correctly positioned slider, so that each subject can earn up to AC8. After the time for
the task has expired, G and B in the same pair view each others’ productivity and the
total amount of money generated, which is deposited in a joint account of the pair. We
chose this procedure to increase salience (List 2007; Bardsley 2008). Furthermore,
we calibrated the difficulty of the task such that maximum productivity is relatively
5In the experiment subjects are assigned the neutral labels A and B.
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Table 1 Allocation problems in RISK-B and RISK-G
RISK-B RISK-G
Problem G’s earnings B’s earnings G’s earnings B’s earnings
1-Certainty X − x1 x1 X − x1 x1
2-Risk X − x2 0.5 : 1.5 · x2, 0.5 · x2 0.5 : 1.5 · (X − x2), 0.5 · (X − x2) x2
3-Risk X − x3 0.8 : 1.25 · x3, 0 · x3 0.8 : 1.25 · (X − x3), 0 · (X − x3) x3
4-Risk X − x4 0.5 : 2 · x4, 0 · x4 0.5 : 2 · (X − x4), 0 · (X − x4) x4
5-Risk X − x5 0.2 : 5 · x5, 0 · x5 0.2 : 5 · (X − x5), 0 · (X − x5) x5
B’s earnings in RISK-B are characterized by p : k ·xn, k ·xn and G’s earnings in RISK-G by
p : k · (X − xn), k · (X − xn)
easy to achieve, which allows us to focus on situations where G and B are equally
productive and only differ in their risk exposure.6
Part 1.b: Allocation problems In this part of the experiment, G is asked to distribute
the amount of money in the group account between himself and B, who is not active in
this phase. G makes decisions in several allocation problems and is informed that only
one decision will be randomly selected at the end of the experiment to be relevant for
payment.
Table 1 shows the characteristics of each allocation problem in the two experi-
ments. We indicate with X − xn the share kept by G and with xn the share given
to B, in allocation problem n. Allocation problem 1-Certainty represents a standard
risk-free dictator game, where G’s and B’s final earnings are equal to the allocation
made by G. In the other four allocation problems risk is introduced. We also imple-
mented two allocation problems characterized by ambiguity, in the sense that the
outcomes’ probabilities are unknown to the subjects. Their characteristics and results
are discussed in Section 4.2.
In experiment RISK-B, G’s final earnings are equal to the share of X that G keeps
for himself, while the final earnings of B depend on which of two possible states of
the world is realized. In the table each risky situation is characterized by p, k, and
k, with k > 1 and 0 ≤ k < 1. With known probability p the good state is realized
and B’s earnings are k times the share allocated to her, while with known probability
1−p the bad state is realized and B’s earnings are a fraction k of her allocated share.
Conversely, in RISK-G, G’s final earnings are risky, while B’s earnings are certain
and equal to the share chosen by G.
In both experiments and in every allocation problem, the expected value of a
given allocation is equal to the allocation itself. This property ensures that givers’
behavior cannot be explained by the desire to achieve greater material efficiency in
6Investigating situations where subjects differ in both risk exposure and productivity could be an interest-
ing avenue for future research. For interesting studies on fairness concerns and productivity differences in
situations without risk, see Cherry et al. (2002) and Cappelen et al. (2007).
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expectation. To illustrate, consider distribution problem 4-Risk. In experiment RISK-
B, with probability p = 0.5, B’s earnings are either 2 ∗x4 or zero, and in expectation
thus equal to x4 and G’s earnings are equal to X − x4 for sure. Conversely, in experi-
ment RISK-G the earnings of B are certain and equal to x4, while G earns X − x4 in
expectations (0.5 ∗ 2 ∗ (X − x4) + 0.5 ∗ 0).
Importantly, in both experiments, G makes allocation decisions before risk is
resolved and with complete knowledge of how risk affects final earnings. The allo-
cation problems are ordered from least risky, 1-Certainty, to most risky, 5-Risk.7 By
varying the riskiness of the allocation problems we can study whether, beyond the
mere presence of risk, giving is also affected by how extreme the final distribution of
outcomes can be.
In the experiment allocation problems appear on the computer screen one at a
time and the order of appearance is randomized at the G-B pair level. Subjects are
informed that the resolution of risk and the determination of earnings takes place
publicly at the end of the experiment, and that they will witness how the chance
devices are operated. In case a risky distribution problem is selected for payment, a
stack of cards numbered from 1 to 100 is used to resolve risk. For instance, if B faces
a 50 percent chance that her allocation is doubled, then this indeed happens if a card
with a number smaller than 51 is drawn.
Part 2: Elicitation of own risk preferences In this part, we implement incentivized
individual decision making tasks in order to elicit participants’ own risk preferences.
Specifically, we elicit participants’ certainty equivalents of six two-outcome lotteries
and use these to estimate subjects’ risk preferences at the individual level.8 Table 2
gives an overview of the outcomes and probabilities of these lotteries. For each lot-
tery, subjects make choices between the lottery and 20 equally spaced sure amounts
that are decreasing monotonically from the lottery’s highest to lowest outcome.
Subjects are not allowed to switch back and forth between the sure amount and the
lottery, which guarantees a unique switching point.9
For each lottery, certainty equivalents are calculated as the arithmetic mean of the
smallest sure amount preferred to the lottery and the next higher sure amount on the
list. Following influential experimental literature estimating risk preferences (e.g.,
Holt and Laury 2002; Andersen et al. 2008; Wakker 2008; Dohmen et al. 2011), we
assume a CRRA power utility function for money U(x) = x1−r , where 0 < r < 1
indicates risk averse, r = 0 risk neutral and r < 0 risk seeking preferences. We
7An allocation problem n + 1 is defined as being riskier than problem n if for any constant rela-
tive risk aversion (CRRA) or constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function for money, the
expected utility of a given risky allocation in n is larger than the expected utility of the same allocation
in n + 1.
8Subjects engaged also in six ambiguous lotteries, which are not used in estimating risk preferences (see
Section 4.2).
9A screen shot showing how lotteries are presented to subjects can be found in Section C of the Electronic
Supplementary Material (ESM).
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Table 2 Lotteries to elicit risk preferences
Lottery p1 x1 x2
1 0.20 40 0
2 0.50 16 0
3 0.80 10 0
4 0.50 12 4
5 0.25 16 4
6 0.33 12 0
p1 is the probability of winning ACx1
estimate the risk preference parameter r at the individual level by minimizing the





(li(r) − cei)2, (1)
where li (r) indicates the theoretically predicted certainty equivalent for lottery i
given r and cei is the elicited certainty equivalent of lottery i. To correct for
heteroscedasticity lotteries are normalized to uniform length. At the end of the exper-
iment one decision is randomly selected to be relevant for payment and earnings are
added to those of the first part.
Part 3: Elicitation of beliefs about others’ risk preferences In order to elicit par-
ticipants’ beliefs about others’ risk preferences, we ask them to estimate the choices
made by the other group member in four of the six risky lotteries of Part 2.10 Belief
elicitation is incentivized using the interval scoring rule.11 That is, participants are
asked to estimate the interval that contains the switching point of the other person,
also allowing for indicating a unique switching point. If the true switching point of
the other person lies inside the indicated interval, the guessing participant earns an
amount that is inversely proportional to the length of the indicated interval. If the true
switching point lies strictly outside the indicated interval, the guessing participant
earns nothing.
We use the midpoints of the elicited intervals to calculate believed certainty equiv-
alents. These are then used to estimate, at the individual level, a measure r of beliefs
about others’ risk preferences, using the same estimation method as described above
for estimating own risk preferences.
In this part participants could earn a maximum of AC1 per lottery. After the task is
finished subjects fill in a post-experiment questionnaire asking questions about their
10Participants also estimated choices of the other group member in two ambiguous lotteries. These are not
used for the estimation of believed risk preferences of others (see Section 4.2).
11The interval scoring rule is less time consuming and cognitively less demanding for subjects than, for
example, the quadratic scoring rule. Further, Schlag and der Weele (2015) show that it allows inferences
that are valid under any degree of subjects’ risk aversion.
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age, gender, field of study etc. Thereafter their total earnings are determined and they
are paid out confidentially in cash.
In total 298 students from Maastricht University participated in the computerized
experiments which were conducted at the Behavioral and Experimental Economics
lab (BEElab) of Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, using the
z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). Participants were randomly assigned to either
experiment RISK-B or RISK-G. Eighty percent of the participants were enrolled in
the School of Business and Economics and the remaining 20 percent followed other
studies, such as law, medicine and arts. Forty-eight percent of the participants were
male and the average age was 24 years. The experiment lasted approximately 75
minutes and the average earnings per subject were AC22.
3 Results
In the real effort task, most subjects were equally and maximally productive, as
intended. Specifically, both G and B achieved the maximum of AC8 in 66 of 73 pairs
in RISK-B and in 71 of 76 pairs in RISK-G. As our focus is the analysis of the effects
of risk and risk preferences on giving, in the following we exclude those pairs where
at least one person did not earn the maximum of AC8. Consequently, in the analyzed
pairs the joint account always contains AC16. Below, we first present the results of
experiment RISK-B followed by the results of experiment RISK-G. For both experi-
ments, we begin by providing some descriptive statistics on all allocation problems.
Thereafter, we provide regression analyzes on the effect of individual risk preferences
and varying riskiness.
Experiment RISK-B Table 3 provides summary statistics on giving in RISK-B.12
We note first that allocations in problem 1-Certainty are in keeping with what is
commonly observed in standard dictator games (see Camerer 2003; Engel 2011).
Givers transfer on averageAC3.70, that is 23% of the joint account, to the beneficiary, a
substantial share of 23% of givers choose the equal split of AC8, 32% allocate nothing
to B, and only very few (3%) give more than the equal split.
In comparing giving in the different allocation problems, Table 3 shows that on
average giving first slightly increases with increasing risk. However, starting with 3-
Risk giving decreases to reach a minimum in the most risky problem 5-Risk. The
figures in the third column of the table show that the number of givers that choose
to split the joint account equally monotonically decreases with the riskiness of the
problem. The frequency of the selfish choice to give nothing is highest in 1-Certainty
but does not differ across risky allocation problems. Finally, ‘hyperfair’ choices of
giving more than the equal split are generally infrequent but appear more often in the
risky problems than in 1-Certainty.
To test if risk preferences are predictive for giving we first estimate the risk aver-
sion parameter r , as described in Part 2 of Section 2. Consistent with previous results
12Section A.1 of the ESM provides histograms of the distributions of giving for all allocation problems.
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Table 3 Summary statistics of giving in RISK-B
Problem Mean(xn) Std.dev.(xn) Equal split No giving More than equal
1-Certainty 3.70 3.69 23% 32% 3%
2-Risk 4.12 3.63 20% 26% 5%
3-Risk 4.25 3.77 14% 26% 12%
4-Risk 3.69 3.45 11% 26% 5%
5-Risk 3.00 3.28 6% 27% 8%
N = 66; ‘Mean’ in AC; ‘Equal split’, ‘No giving’, and ‘More than equal’ are frequencies in percent
(e.g., Holt and Laury 2002), we find that givers are on average moderately averse to
risk (mean r = 0.27, std.dev.(r) = 0.30). We then use these individual level esti-
mates as an explanatory variable in regression analyses with the various measures of
giving presented in Table 3 as dependent variables.
Table 4 shows the results. Specifications (1)–(2) report OLS regressions with AC
allocations to the beneficiary as the dependent variable. Specifications (3)–(8) report
Probit regressions where the dependent variable takes on the value 1 if, respectively,
an equal split is offered (Equal split), nothing is given to the beneficiary (Selfish),
and more than the equal split is given (Hyperfair). In all Probit specifications the
dependent variable takes on the value 0 otherwise. In all regressions standard errors
are adjusted for clustering on the individual giver.
Specification (1) shows that giving is positively and significantly associated with
risk aversion. That is, the more risk averse givers are, the more money they allocate to
beneficiaries. An increase in risk aversion of 0.1 points increases giving by approx-
imately 30 euro cents. In specification (2), the riskiness of the allocation problem is
added as a trend variable taking on the value 1 for 1-Certainty, 2 for 2-Risk and so on.
The regression result shows that the effect of risk preferences on allocations is robust
to controlling for the riskiness of the allocation problem.13 In addition, riskiness has
an independent effect as increasing riskiness significantly decreases allocations to
the beneficiary. Thus, holding risk preferences constant, on average, givers become
less generous the larger the outcome risk of beneficiaries.
Specifications (3)–(4) show no effect of risk preferences on the likelihood of
equal splits but indicate that this likelihood decreases with the riskiness of the allo-
cation problem. In contrast, specifications (5)–(6) show that givers who are less
risk averse are more likely to make the selfish choice of keeping everything. This
is consistent with the above reported result that giving increases with givers’ risk
aversion. The risk beneficiaries face appears to be unrelated to selfish choices.
Finally, the likelihood of allocations larger than the equal split is neither related to
risk preferences nor to the riskiness of the allocation problem as can be seen from
specifications (7)–(8).
13Below we conduct additional regressions where we replace the trend variable with dummy variables for
each allocation problem. The results regarding the effect of risk preferences are also robust to this change
in the regression specification.
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Table 4 Regressions RISK-B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Allocation Allocation Equal split Equal split Selfish Selfish Hyperfair Hyperfair
Risk aversion 2.853** 2.853** 0.176 0.175 − 0.352** − 0.352** 0.103 0.102
(1.1756) (1.1774) (0.1111) (0.1121) (0.1550) (0.1551) (0.0685) (0.0686)
Riskiness − 0.183*** − 0.042*** − 0.009 0.008
(0.0678) (0.0108) (0.0081) (0.0053)
Constant 2.977*** 3.525***
(0.4536) (0.5459)
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.064
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.066 0.048 0.048 0.037 0.042
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; standard errors adjusted for 66 clusters on givers level in
parentheses; specifications (1) and (2) report OLS regression results, specifications (3)–(8) report Probit
marginal effects
In experiment RISK-B the risk is on the beneficiaries’ side and it is therefore
conceivable that givers’ allocation decisions are also affected by their beliefs about
others’ risk preferences. In Part 3 of the experiment we have elicited these beliefs
r and find that they are on average very similar to givers’ own risk preferences
(mean r = 0.28, std.dev.(r) = 0.33). Moreover, the two measures, r and r , are signif-
icantly positively correlated (Pearson correlation = 0.54, p < 0.01). The observed
correlation is consistent with the so-called ‘false consensus effect’, that is, the ten-
dency of people to overestimate the extent to which their beliefs, preferences and
values are similar to those of others (see Mullen et al. 1985 for an extensive meta-
study on the false consensus effect and Engelmann and Strobel (2000) for a critical
examination).
When regressing allocations to B on the riskiness of the allocation problem and
on believed risk preferences of others instead of own risk preferences (cf. Table 4,
specification (2)) we find that believed risk preferences are marginally significantly
and positively correlated with giving (see Table A.1 in Section A.2 of the ESM).
The strong correlation between r and r makes it difficult to determine whether own
risk preferences or beliefs about others’ risk preferences or both are predictive for
giving. However, when adding own risk preferences as an explanatory variable to
the regression these are marginally significant, whereas beliefs about others’ risk
preferences cease to be significant. This suggests that it is own risk preferences rather
than beliefs about others’ risk preferences that affects givers’ generosity.
We close the discussion of results in RISK-B by taking a more detailed look at
how the riskiness of the allocation problem, individuals’ risk aversion, and the inter-
action of both affect giving. Specifically, we run OLS regressions with allocations of
givers as the dependent variable and dummy variables indicating the riskiness of the
allocation problem as well as givers’ risk aversion as independent variables. To exam-
ine whether the effect of risk aversion changes with the riskiness of the allocation
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problem we add interactions between the riskiness dummies and the risk aversion
variable. Table 5 reports the results of these regressions as specification (1) and (2),
respectively.
We first note that in both specifications the coefficient of givers’ risk aversion
is significant. Thus, the effect of givers’ risk preferences on allocations reported in
Table 4 is robust to these specifications. Specification (1) shows that allocations first
slightly increase and then decrease along the riskiness dimension. F -tests indicate
that the riskiness dummies are jointly significantly different and that this difference
is driven by 5-Risk, where allocations are significantly smaller than in the other allo-
cation problems (pair-wise tests, p ≤ 0.0046). All other pair-wise comparisons are
Table 5 Regressions for RISK-B riskiness dummies, risk aversion and interaction effects
No interactions With interactions
(1) (2)






4-Risk − 0.008 0.170
(0.2825) (0.3894)
5-Risk − 0.697** − 0.607*
(0.2894) (0.3568)
Risk aversion 2.853** 3.394**
(1.1828) (0.7323)
2-Risk*Risk aversion − 1.088
(1.0400)
3-Risk*Risk aversion − 0.633
(1.0221)
4-Risk*Risk aversion − 0.654
(1.0149)
5-Risk*Risk aversion − 0.333
(1.1099)
Observations 330 330
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.048
F -tests of joint significance (P -value)
Riskiness dummies 0.0031 0.0033
Interactions 0.8298
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; OLS regressions; in parentheses standard errors adjusted for 66
on givers level
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Table 6 Summary statistics of giving in RISK-G
Problem Mean(xn) Std.dev.(xn) Equal split No giving More than equal
1-Certainty 4.17 4.15 30% 34% 6%
2-Risk 3.89 3.54 15% 31% 7%
3-Risk 3.96 3.59 14% 27% 7%
4-Risk 4.44 3.84 17% 28% 10%
5-Risk 3.99 4.06 15% 37% 11%
N = 71; ‘Mean’ in AC; ‘Equal split’, ‘No giving’, and ‘More than equal’ are frequencies in percent
statistically not significant (p ≥ 0.1029). Turning to specification (2) we see that
the results across the riskiness dimension remain qualitatively the same. Pair-wise
comparisons again show that only in 5-Risk allocations are significantly smaller than
in all other allocation problems involving risk (p ≤ 0.0030). The insignificance of
the interaction variables (p ≥ 0.300) indicates that the effect of risk aversion is
independent of the riskiness of the allocation problem. At first sight it may appear
counter-intuitive that the effect of risk aversion is the same in 1-Certainty and the
allocation problems with risk. We come back to this in Section 4.1 when we relate
the empirical results to a model of other-regarding preferences under risk.
Experiment RISK-G In this section we analyze giving decisions in RISK-G, that
is, in allocation problems where givers themselves are exposed to outcome risk. We
proceed in the same way as for experiment RISK-B and start with some descriptive
statistics shown in Table 6.14
Allocations in 1-Certainty are similar to those observed in the same problem in
experiment RISK-B and in standard dictator games.15 Givers allocate on average
AC4.17 to the beneficiary, that is 26% of the joint account. Thirty percent of givers
choose the equal split, 34% give nothing to B, and 6% give more than the equal split
of AC8.
The average allocations in Table 6 do not exhibit a clear pattern along the riski-
ness dimension, suggesting that on average allocations are not related to the riskiness
of G’s earnings. Interestingly, the frequency of equal splits drops by 50% when mov-
ing from 1-Certainty to 2-Risk but stays more or less constant across the different
allocation problems with risk. In contrast, the frequency of selfish choices is largely
unaffected by the risk borne by G. On the other hand, hyperfair allocations of more
than the equal split appear to be slightly increasing with the riskiness of the allocation
problem.
Similar to experiment RISK-B, also in RISK-G givers are moderately risk averse
(mean r = 0.14, std.dev.(r) = 0.37).16 To test for the effect of risk preferences we
14Section A.1 of the ESM provides histograms of the distributions of giving for all allocation problems.
15There is no statistically significant difference between RISK-G and RISK-B when comparing giving in
1-Certainty (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p = 0.6243, 2-sided).
16Compared to RISK-B, givers in RISK-G are marginally significantly less risk averse (Mann-Whitney
rank-sum test, p = 0.0508, two-sided.)
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conduct regression analysis with specifications equivalent to those for experiment
RISK-B. Table 7 reports the results. Specifications (1)–(2) show that allocations to B
are significantly negatively related with risk aversion of the giver. That is, the more
risk averse givers are, the less they give to beneficiaries. Put differently, more risk
averse givers appear to compensate themselves more for their exposure to risk. This
resonates well with the finding in RISK-B where we observe that more risk averse
givers compensate beneficiaries for their risk exposure more than less risk averse
givers do. In contrast to RISK-B, the riskiness of the allocation problem is not a
significant determinant of giving.
The Probit estimates in specifications (3)–(4) show that G’s risk aversion is unre-
lated to the likelihood of splitting resources equally and that it is significantly
decreasing with the riskiness of the allocation problem. Thus, as in RISK-B, also in
RISK-G givers are less inclined to share resources equally when earnings become
more risky. Interestingly, selfish choices of giving nothing are related neither to
givers’ risk aversion nor to the riskiness of the allocation problem (see specifications
(5)–(6)). In contrast, specifications (7)–(8) show that the likelihood of making hyper-
fair offers of more than the equal split are significantly negatively related to givers’
risk aversion and significantly positively related to the riskiness of the allocation
problem.
Similarly to RISK-B, we find that beliefs about the risk preferences of others are
on average similar to givers’ own risk preferences (mean r = 0.14, std.dev.(r) =
0.42) and that the two measures are positively correlated (Pearson correlation=0.59,
p < 0.01). We have also run regressions with allocations as the dependent variable
and beliefs about risk preferences of others as an (additional) explanatory variable.
In these regressions beliefs are never significant, irrespective of whether they are
included next to only riskiness or next to riskiness and own risk aversion. The latter
remain significantly negative when including believed risk preferences (see Table A.1
Table 7 Regressions RISK-G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Allocation Allocation Equal split Equal split Selfish Selfish Hyperfair Hyperfair
Risk aversion − 1.672** − 1.672** − 0.011 − 0.013 − 0.021 − 0.021 − 0.117** − 0.118***
(0.7280) (0.7291) (0.0740) (0.0733) (0.0923) (0.0922) (0.0454) (0.0455)
Riskiness 0.025 − 0.027** 0.004 0.016**
(0.1083) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0076)
Constant 4.367*** 4.293***
(0.4043) (0.5177)
Observations 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.021
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.075
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; standard errors adjusted for 69 clusters on givers level in
parentheses; specifications (1) and (2) report OLS regression results, specifications (3)–(8) report Probit
marginal effects; two givers are excluded from the analysis because their estimated risk aversion is infinite
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in Section A.2 of the ESM). Hence, in RISK-G own risk preferences are robust
determinants of givers’ generosity under risk.
As for RISK-B we close the discussion of results in RISK-G by taking a more
detailed look at how the riskiness of the decision situation, individuals’ risk aversion, and
the interaction of both affect giving. Table 8 reports the regression results. In both regres-
sions the coefficient of givers’ risk aversion is negative and significant, showing that
the effect of givers’ risk preferences on allocations reported in Table 7 is robust to these
specifications. All other variables however are statistically not significant. Thus, in
RISK-G there is neither a direct effect of riskiness on giving nor does the effect of
Table 8 Regressions for RISK-G riskiness dummies, risk aversion and interaction effects
No interactions With interactions
(1) (2)
Constant (1-Certainty) 4.416*** 4.654***
(0.5165) (0.5598)
2-Risk − 0.290 − 0.714
(0.4308) (0.5989)




5-Risk − 0.203 − 0.234
(0.4662) (0.4732)











Adjusted R2 0.015 0.019
F -tests of joint significance (P -value)
Riskiness dummies 0.6029 0.7043
Interactions 0.1213
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; OLS regressions; in parentheses standard errors adjusted for 69
clusters on givers level; two givers are excluded from the analysis because their estimated risk aversion is
infinite
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risk aversion interact with the riskiness of the allocation problem. We discuss this
outcome in relation to a model of social preferences under risk in Section 4.1 below.
4 Discussion
In this section we first discuss our empirical results in relation to a simple model
of other-regarding preferences that allows for ex-ante and ex-post fairness concerns
as well as for risk aversion. Thereafter, we briefly report the results of allocation
problems under ambiguity.
4.1 Ex-ante and ex-post fairness, riskiness, and risk aversion
In the literature a few theoretical models of social preferences where risk is explicitly
taken into account have been proposed (see, e.g., Trautmann 2009; Krawczyk 2011;
Saito 2013).17 For instance, the model put forward by Saito (2013) allows for an ex-
ante and an ex-post view of fairness in the presence of outcome risk. However, these
models assume (piece-wise) linearity in own and others’ earnings and are therefore
silent about the potential effect of risk aversion found in our experiments. To circum-
vent this shortcoming we propose here a simple generalization of the existing models
and discuss the extent to which such a model’s prediction is consistent with our data.
Specifically, we combine the expected inequality-aversion model of Saito (2013)
with Neilson’s 2006 non-linear generalization of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model
of other-regarding preferences.18 We use this model to derive qualitative predictions
for each allocation problem in both of our experiments.
Before moving on we want to emphasize that it is not our aim to provide a test
of such a model. Our experiments were not designed with this objective in mind and
the following discussion should be viewed as such. Our discussion will show that
many questions remain open and we hope that it inspires further experimental and
theoretical work on other-regarding preferences in the face of risk.
Building on Saito (2013), we assume that in choosing an allocation x the deci-
sion maker, the giver in our experiment, may care both about inequality in ex-ante
expected payoffs and in ex-post realized outcomes, as described by
V (x) = δU(Ep(x)) + (1 − δ)Ep(U(x)).
The term U(Ep(x)) captures the utility of expected payoffs and is referred to as
ex-ante utility, whereas the term Ep(U(x)) captures the expected utility of ex-post
payoffs and is referred to as ex-post utility. The parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] measures the
relative importance that the giver attributes to ex-ante utility. The function U(x) =
u1(X −xn)−αu2(max {xn − (X −xn), 0})−βu2(max {(X −xn)−xn, 0}) reflects a
non-linear generalization of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
17See also Fudenberg and Levine (2012) for a discussion on the problems of extending social preferences
models to lotteries.
18Neilson (2006) shows that a preference ordering satisfying completeness, transitivity, continuity and a
separability axiom called ‘self-referent separability’ can be uniquely represented by a function U(x) =
u0(x0) + ∑ni=1 ui(xi − x0), where utility functions u0, ..., un are unique up to a joint increasing affine
transformation.
J Risk Uncertain (2017) 55:95–118 111
with u1 and u2 being concave and strictly increasing in its argument. The term X−xn
is the monetary payoff of the giver and xn is the monetary payoff of the beneficiary
in our experiments. The parameters α ≥0 and β ∈[0, 1[ with β ≤α capture aversion
to respectively disadvantageous and advantageous inequality.
In the following we first present the qualitative predictions in terms of allocations
across the riskiness of the allocation problems and compare them to the observed
behavior in our experiment. Thereafter we discuss potential effects of risk aversion
and how these compare to our data. All formal proofs can be found in Section B of
the ESM.
Table 9 summarizes the allocation predictions of the model across all decision
problems and for pure ex-ante utility (δ = 1) (Panel a), which is equivalent to
1-Certainty, and pure ex-post utility (δ = 0) for both RISK-B and RISK-G (Panel b
and Panel c, respectively). From Panel a we see that, depending on the strength of
social preferences, givers should allocate to beneficiaries between zero (if β < β1)
and anything up to 8 (if β ≥ β1). Comparing these with the average actual alloca-
tions in 1-Certainty reported in Table 3 for RISK-B and Table 6 for RISK-G, we see
that actual allocations indeed fall mostly into this range (only very few givers allo-
cate more than half of the endowment to the beneficiary). Note that pure ex-ante
utility implies no change of giving across allocation problems. We have seen, how-
ever, that (at least in RISK-B) giving is affected by the riskiness of the allocation
problem and can thus not be explained on the basis of ex-ante utility alone. We there-
fore conclude that overall allocations are consistent with givers having, on average,
sufficiently strong other-regarding preferences and a mixture of ex-ante and ex-post
concerns. This observation is in line with earlier results (e.g., Krawczyk 2010; Brock
et al. 2013).
We next focus on ex-post utility in RISK-B. From Panel b in Table 9 we note that
the other-regarding preferences threshold for giving a positive amount, β1, is the same
in all allocation problems and that this threshold is independent of the parameters
p, k, and k̄, which determine the riskiness of the allocation problem. It thus follows
that the frequency of decisions that allocate nothing to the beneficiary should not
vary across the allocation problems. This is indeed what we find in our data (see
Table 3 column “No giving” and Table 4 specification (6)). Further predictions are
less straightforward as the other threshold, β2, is not independent of and does not vary
monotonically with the riskiness of the allocation problem. Nevertheless, it appears
reasonable to expect that positive allocations tend to decrease with the riskiness of
the allocation problem for the following reasons. First, for advantageous inequality
aversion that is not too strong (β < β2) the predicted positive allocations tend to
decrease with increasing riskiness, and second, in the literature there is little evidence
for high β values (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999) that could countervail this effect.
We indeed find evidence for decreased giving with increasing riskiness (see Table 3
columns “Mean” and “Equal split” and Table 4 specification (2)). That this effect is
mainly driven by 5-Risk (see Table 5) is also consistent with the predictions.
The threshold β1 for giving a positive amount is independent of the riskiness of
the allocation problem but does depend on the concavity of u1 and u2 and thus the
risk aversion of the giver. It can be shown that for a given concavity of u2 as well as
for u1 = u2, an increase in risk aversion in the self-regarding utility component u1
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Table 9 Optimal giving in RISK-B and RISK-G with ex-ante utility (δ = 1) and ex-post utility (δ = 0)
in dependence of strength of social preferences
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leads to a decrease of β1.19 Thus, the model predicts that allocations may increase
with increasing risk aversion of the giver in 1-Certainty and in allocation problems
with risk but that there is not necessarily an interaction effect (positive or negative)
of riskiness and risk aversion on allocation decisions. This is consistent with the
regression results shown in Table 5.
Turning to ex-post utility in RISK-G we see from Panel c in Table 9 that
comparative statics predictions across the riskiness of allocation problems are not
straightforward. First, the relation between β1, on the one hand, and β3 and β4, on
the other hand, is ambiguous making a comparison of 1-Certainty with the other allo-
cation problems impossible. Moreover, both β3 and β4 depend non-trivially on the
concavity of u1 and u2 as well as the parameters p, k, and k̄, which determine the
riskiness of the allocation problems. Thus clear predictions are difficult to derive.
However, under some assumptions on the shape of the functions u1 and u2 it can be
shown that β3 is smaller than β4 and that β4 is increasing with the riskiness param-
eter k. Together this implies that the fraction of decisions allocating nothing to the
beneficiary should weakly increase from 2-Risk to 5-Risk. Our regression result in
Table 7 (specification (6)) shows a positive but statistically insignificant correlation
of the frequency of giving nothing with the riskiness of the allocation problem. In
that sense, the data from the experiment are consistent with the model’s prediction.
Panel c in Table 9 suggests also that increasing riskiness may increase hyperfair
giving—that is, allocations larger than the equal split of 8—because the maximum
predicted amounts tend to increase with riskiness.20 The regression analysis in
Table 7 (specification (8)) reports a significantly positive correlation between hyper-
fair allocations and riskiness and the results reported in Table 6 (column (More than
equal)) suggest that this is driven mainly by 4-Risk and 5-Risk. Both observations are
consistent with the predictions. However, this does not necessarily imply that alloca-
tions generally increase with risk because the mentioned β thresholds are also increas-
ing and the model is generally silent about the distribution of positive allocations.
Turning to individuals’ risk aversion we note that the observed negative effect of
risk aversion on giving is at odds with the model’s predictions. Moreover, the effect
of changing risk aversion on the β thresholds is generally ambiguous, impeding clear
comparative statics predictions.
In summary, we find that the proposed model organizes important aspects of the
data surprisingly well for RISK-B but that this is much less the case for RISK-G.
Especially, the observed negative effect of risk aversion on giving in all allocation
problems in the latter experiment is hard to square with the model’s predictions. In a
sense, this is not too surprising as the model is a first attempt to incorporate ex-ante
and ex-post fairness concerns, other-regarding preferences, and risk aversion in one
(simple) model and thus does not consider a number of other potentially important
motivations of social behavior under risk. It is clear that further empirical and theo-
retical investigations are necessary to better understand all aspects of these different
19In Section B of the ESM this is shown assuming constant relative risk aversion.
20The intuition for this result is that increasing riskiness also implies potentially large advantageous
inequality ex-post due to increasing high earnings in the good state and limited low earnings in the bad
state.
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motivations. We mention here just a few that could be especially interesting for future
research.
In our analysis we have retained expected utility assumptions. There is however
ample evidence that observed behavior under risk often violates such assumptions
(Rabin 2000). For instance, people tend to weight probabilities non-linearly and eval-
uate outcomes with respect to endogenously formed reference points (see Kahneman
and Tversky 1979, 1991; Kőszegi and Rabin 2006). Future research could incorporate
these important behavioral aspects into models of social decision making under risk
and test them empirically.
We find that when beneficiaries are exposed to risk, they are allocated less
when the riskiness of their earnings is high. As discussed, this is consistent with
givers being not only concerned with ex-ante fairness but also taking ex-post fair-
ness considerations into account. An alternative interpretation is suggested by the
observations of Haisley and Weber (2010), who find that generosity decreases in
environments where self-serving interpretations of fairness are available for the deci-
sion maker (see also Broberg et al. 2007; Dana et al. 2007). Thus, givers may behave
less generously when allocations for beneficiaries are riskier by focusing on the ben-
eficiaries’ high possible outcome and ignoring the low one. Such a self-centered
view may also be consistent with the negative effect of risk aversion on giving
in RISK-G, if self-centeredness is correlated with risk preferences and own risk
exposure.
Givers may also have a concern for ex-ante material efficiency, which was ruled
out by design in our experiments. For instance, risk averse givers may perceive that
the aggregate expected utility at the pair level increases when money is allocated
away from the side bearing the risk. If selfish motives are traded off against these type
of efficiency concerns, we may expect that there is on average no effect of riskiness
on allocations, as observed in our experiment where givers had to bear the risk. To
test this hypothesis future research could propose a model incorporating social and
risk preferences as well as efficiency concerns.
4.2 Allocation problems characterized by ambiguity
Our experiments also included two allocation problems characterized by ambigu-
ity, that is, problems in which the probability of either state is unknown to the
giver. We implement these problems because outside the experimental laboratory
often decisions have to be taken without precise probabilistic information. In order
to operationalize ambiguity in the laboratory, we used a stack of 100 cards colored
black and red. Participants were free to choose a winning color at the beginning
of the experiment, but neither the participants nor the experimenter knew the exact
color composition of the stack. Participants were informed that, in case one of
these allocation problems turned out to be relevant for payment, at the end of the
experiment the winning color would be determined by randomly drawing a card from
the stack.
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Table 10 Allocation problems with ambiguity in RISK-B and RISK-G
RISK-B RISK-G
Problem G’s earnings B’s earnings G’s earnings B’s earnings
6-Ambiguity X − x6 p̃ : 1.5 · x6, 0.5 · x6 p̃ : 1.5 · (X − x6), 0.5 · (X − x6) x6
7-Ambiguity X − x7 p̃ : 2 · x7, 0 · x7 p̃ : 2 · (X − x7), 0 · (X − x7) x7
B’s earnings in RISK-B are characterized by p̃ : k · xn, k · xn and G’s earnings in RISK-G by
p̃ : k · (X − xn), k · (X − xn), where p̃ is an unknown probability between 0 and 1
Table 10 displays the allocation problems’ characteristics, where the unknown
probability is indicated by p̃. Note that problem 6-Ambiguity (7-Ambiguity) is the
ambiguous equivalent of problem 2-Risk (4-Risk). We do not have model-based
predictions but since individuals are usually ambiguity averse (see, e.g., Ellsberg
1961; Dimmock et al. 2015), we considered that ambiguity may have similar effects
as increased risk aversion in allocation problems under risk.
Table 11 shows descriptive statistics on giving in the presence of ambiguity. We
find that in RISK-B allocations in 6-Ambiguity are only marginally significantly
lower than in 2-Risk (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.082), while allocations in 7-
Ambiguity and 4-Risk are statistically indistinguishable (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p = 0.693). In RISK-G we find that allocations in the ambiguous problems are
not significantly different from the corresponding risky ones (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p = 0.381 and p = 0.786, respectively). These results suggest that in our
experiments givers treat allocation problems under ambiguity similarly to equivalent
ones under risk.
In what follows we present the analysis of subjects’ attitudes to ambiguity, and
beliefs about others’ attitudes, which confirms this interpretation. In Part 2 of the
experiment subjects faced two decision screens where they made 20 choices between
a fixed lottery with known outcomes but unknown probabilities (i.e., an ambigu-
ous lottery), and a lottery with the same possible outcomes and a known probability
Table 11 Summary statistics of giving under ambiguity in RISK-B and RISK-G
Experiment Problem Mean(xn) Std.dev.(xn) Equal split No giving More than equal
Risk-B 6-Ambiguity 3.83 3.89 12% 26% 8%
7-Ambiguity 3.82 3.48 15% 24% 3%
Risk-G 6-Ambiguity 3.72 3.89 14% 32% 10%
7-Ambiguity 4.17 3.86 20% 34% 11%
N = 66 in RISK-B and N = 71 in RISK-G
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distribution, that varies in steps of 5% (i.e., 20 risky lotteries).21 The switching point
from one type of lottery to the other is an indication of a subject’s subjective belief
about the ambiguous event, and in this sense represents a measure of ambiguity atti-
tude. For instance, switching to the ambiguous lottery when the winning probability
of the risky lottery is 40% reveals stronger ambiguity aversion than switching when
the risky probability is 60%. In Part 3, beliefs about the ambiguity attitudes of the
other group member are elicited by asking subjects to guess the interval that contains
the other’s switching point, in the same way as for beliefs about risk attitudes.
We find that in both experiments givers are close to being ambiguity neutral, as
they switch to the ambiguous lottery when the risky lottery has a winning probability
close to 0.5 (0.47 in RISK-B and 0.46 in RISK-G). Moreover givers’ ambigu-
ity attitudes and beliefs are significantly correlated (Pearson correlation ≥ 0.49,
p < 0.01).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated individuals’ giving behavior in situations where respec-
tively givers and beneficiaries are exposed to various degrees of risk. We also
collected data on individuals’ risk preferences and on their beliefs about the risk pref-
erences of others, both in isolation from social preferences. We find that givers’ risk
preferences are an important determinant of generosity. A more risk averse giver allo-
cates more to the beneficiary when the risk is on the beneficiary’s side and allocates
less when the risk is on the giver’s side. Beliefs about the risk preferences of others
play basically no role. Thus, givers appear to compensate the side that has to bear the
risk, taking their own risk preferences into account.
Existing models of other-regarding preferences do not take into account individual
risk preferences of those involved. Our evidence shows however that risk preferences
are important in social decision situations and that the predictive power of such mod-
els would likely be improved when explicitly taking into account attitudes toward
risk. We propose a simple model allowing for other-regarding preferences, ex-ante
and ex-post views of fairness, and risk preferences. We find that behavior is surpris-
ingly consistent with the model’s predictions when the risk is on the beneficiary’s
side. However, when risk is on the giver’s side consistency is worse and especially
the effect of risk aversion is at odds with the model’s prediction. The proposed model
is just a first simple step toward a better understanding of the interaction of social
and risk preferences. In the paper we have proposed possible extensions and suggest
some future research.
It has been shown that risk preferences relate to observable socio-demographic
characteristics (see, e.g., Donkers et al. 2001; Dohmen et al. 2011; von Gaudecker
et al. 2011). Therefore, our results, connecting risk preferences with giving, could be
useful for policy makers and institutions as well as firms who benefit from knowing
how pro-social behavior of different social groups responds to risks. In addition, our
21A screen shot of this task is provided in Section C of the ESM.
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results may be useful for organizations and individuals who have to make allocation
decisions under risk. For instance, for charity organizations or individual researchers
who have to raise funds, our evidence suggests that projects with high risk and high
returns may be less successful in attracting funding than projects with a safer outlook.
We see large heterogeneity of behaviors in our experiments in both giving under
certainty and giving under risk. When there is certainty, this may be accounted
for by assuming heterogeneity purely in social preferences. Under risk, additional
aspects enter the picture. For instance, in a previous paper we provide evidence
that uninvolved individuals differ substantially in their views on what constitutes a
just allocation under risk, even if they share the same view when there is certainty
(Cettolin and Riedl 2017). It could be interesting to explore whether the large hetero-
geneity observed in the experiments reported here is also rooted in diverging views
of justice under risk.
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